The traditional competitive analysis of mergers was developed mainly by judges in the United States, with training in neither economics nor antitrust, who had to decide whether particular mergers substantially lessened competition. Economists participated in that process mainly as expert witnesses, typically offering little more than ultimate conclusions. Economic models (for example, models of oligopoly) and empirical studies (for example, of the relationship between market concentration and price) were at most a basis for crude intuition about the effects of increased market concentration.
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Traditional merger analysis has been giving way to a more scientific inquiry that applies the full panoply of tools provided by modern economics. The competitive analysis of mergers increasingly employs formal microeconomic models and econometrics-statistical analysis designed for, and applied to, economic data. Of 1 particular significance in merger cases is the use of "calibrated economic models," i.e., quantitative analysis using formal economic models in which the values of the key parameters are based on the observable facts of the merger under review. The calibration of models to the facts of the case may be based on econometric studies or direct measurements of relevant quantities. And calibrated economic models may be used to inform the traditional structural analysis of mergers, based on market delineation and market shares, or used instead of structural analysis.
Calibrated economic models offer three advantages in merger analysis. First, they bring key issues into sharper focus by making assumptions explicit and identifying which factors are critical and precisely how they matter. Second, they add accuracy to the analysis by quantifying issues of importance and relying on calculations rather than intuition. Third, they make the analysis more persuasive in a judicial proceeding by making it more concrete and better grounded in both the facts of case and economic theory. These advantages are illustrated below first in market delineation and second in 2 directly assessing the competitive effects of mergers.
Calibrated Economic Models for Market Delineation
In traditional structural analysis, market delineation is central to horizontal merger cases, and it often has proved decisive in court. It is not surprising, therefore, that calibrated economic models are most commonly used, and have been most influential, in market delineation. The hypothetical monopolist paradigm for market delineation, which has become a standard tool for merger analysis around the world, holds that a collection 3 of products and an area constitute a market only if a hypothetical monopolist over them would maximize its profits by raising price at least some specific threshold amount, such as 5%. This paradigm is now commonly implemented using calibrated economic models.
The formal economic model of monopoly is both very simple and relatively straightforward to apply to market delineation using the hypothetical monopolist paradigm. The model teaches that the monopolist sets its price to equate its price-cost margin (price minus marginal cost, all divided by price) with the reciprocal of its elasticity Demand elasticity is the responsiveness of the quantity consumers demand to a change in 4 price. Responsiveness of a product's quantity to its own price is an "own elasticity of demand," and responsiveness to the price of another product is a "cross elasticity of demand." Both are expressed as a quotient; the numerator being the percentage change in quantity, and the denominator being the percentage change in price inducing that quantity change. The greater the own elasticity of demand, the more "elastic" demand is said to be. Demand is also said to be "elastic" ("inelastic") when the own elasticity of demand is less than 1, meaning that a 1% change in a product's price induces more (less) than a 1% reduction in its quantity demanded.
Only linear demand and constant elasticity demand yield simple formulas as in footnote 5 8. From the perspective of a plaintiff challenging a merger, linear demand normally is the more conservative assumption, as it makes it more difficult to pass the hypothetical monopolist test.
There is an extensive literature on these tools: Michael G. 119-20 (1992) .
Described in the text is the "profit-maximization critical loss," which is consistent with the 7 profit-maximization assumption in the hypothetical monopolist paradigm. More commonly used of demand. The main difficulty in applying this lesson is that the monopolist's elasticity 4 of demand depends on its price. Demand generally is more elastic at higher prices, and the monopoly price normally exceeds the pre-merger price at which the elasticity of demand is assessed in market delineation. To make direct use of the monopoly model, it is therefore necessary to make an assumption about how the elasticity of demand changes with price, or equivalently, about the curvature of demand. A common and relatively conservative assumption is that demand is linear.
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Assuming linear demand, it is straightforward to operationalize the hypothetical monopolist test in terms of a "critical elasticity of demand" or "critical sales loss." The 6 former is the highest pre-merger elasticity of demand the hypothetical monopolist could face and still want to raise price at least the threshold amount. The latter is the maximum loss in unit sales the hypothetical monopolist would be willing to suffer and still raise price at least the threshold amount. The critical elasticity of demand and the critical sales 7 is the "breakeven critical loss"-the greatest reduction in quantity the hypothetical monopolist could experience and still not suffer a net loss in profit from the threshold price increase. The attractive feature of breakeven critical loss is that it does not depend on the functional form (curvature) of demand. And if the price-increase-significance threshold is small, like 5%, and the margin high, the breakeven critical loss is quite close to the profit-maximization critical loss.
Denoting the price-increase threshold as t and the price-cost margin as m (both expressed 8 as proportions), the critical demand elasticity with linear demand is 1/(m + 2t), and the critical sales loss is t/(m + 2t). The breakeven critical loss for any demand curve is t/(m + t). See Werden, Demand Elasticities, supra note 3, at 388-91, 410-12.
Calibration can be subtle: There may be significant conceptual issues in reckoning the 9 relevant marginal cost, and the larger the reduction in output and the longer the period of time allowed to adjust to the post-merger environment, the greater the associated reduction in cost and the lower the relevant price-cost margin. loss are entirely determined by the price-increase threshold (typically specified to be 5%) and the pre-merger price-cost margin.
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The hypothetical monopolist test is routinely calibrated from accounting data reflecting the industry price-cost margin: Having measured that margin, it is 9 immediately clear when the demand faced by the hypothetical monopolist is so elastic that it would not raise price at least the threshold amount. If the margin is quite high (80-100%), the critical elasticity of demand is close to 1, meaning that a loss in sales of only about 5% would be sufficient to dissuade the hypothetical monopolist from increasing price by 5%. If the margin is quite low (less than 25%), the critical elasticity of demand is greater than 3, meaning that a loss in sales of more than 15% would be necessary to dissuade the hypothetical monopolist from increasing price by 5%. Typical margins (50-60%) yield critical demand elasticities of roughly 1.5.
Critical elasticity and critical loss analysis bring market delineation into much sharper focus. It has long been understood that market delineation is about demand elasticity, but critical elasticity and critical loss analysis make it exquisitely clear that the only relevant demand elasticity is the own elasticity of demand faced by the hypothetical monopolist.
Most importantly, critical elasticity and critical loss analysis indicate exactly when the hypothetical monopolist's demand would be sufficiently inelastic to induce the hypothetical monopolist to raise price significantly. Finally, critical elasticity and critical loss analysis highlight the importance of pre-merger price-cost margins as a determinant of the relevant market.
In the United States, expert testimony may be excluded for lack of "fit" with the facts of 10 the case. See General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) ("A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered."); Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 242 (1993) ("When expert testimony is not supported by sufficient facts to validate it in the eyes of the law, or when indisputable record facts contradict or otherwise render the opinion unreasonable, it cannot support a jury's verdict. Expert testimony is useful as a guide to interpreting market facts, but it is not a substitute for them.") (citation omitted).
Similarly, it is easy to model the scenario in which quasi-fixed costs are avoided as output 11 is decreased because some productive capacity is shut down. And it is straightforward to model more complex demand scenarios, for example, a product with several distinct uses and significantly different elasticities of demand in the different uses.
Critical loss analysis was used in this way and was highly significant in several litigated 12 merger cases in the United States. FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045 , 1050 -51, 1053 (8th Cir. 1999 United States v. Mercy Health Services, 902 F. Supp. 968, 980-81 (N.D. Iowa 1995 ), vacated as moot, 107 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 1997 California v. Sutter Health System, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1057 , 1076 -80 (N.D. Cal. 2000 , aff 'd, 217 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2000) , opinion amended by 130 F. Supp. 2d 1109 , 1128 -32 (N.D. Cal. 2001 .
Because formal economic models are built on explicit assumptions, they also focus the analysis by facilitating an inquiry into how well they "fit" the facts of a case. The 10 proper use of calibrated economic models involves careful consideration of the facts and constructs models consistent with them. Standard critical elasticity and critical loss calculations assume, for example, that the hypothetical monopolist has constant marginal costs. When this assumption is unrealistic, the standard calculations should not be used; rather, a more realistic cost model can be calibrated. If investigation reveals that different units of productive capacity have differing marginal costs, the hypothetical monopolist can be modeled accordingly. The additional information required to calibrate the 11 hypothetical monopolist's cost function is not difficult to obtain in many cases.
Most often, a calculated critical elasticity or critical loss is used as a yardstick to evaluate the significance of non-quantitative evidence on likely consumer switching in the event of a price increase. In such cases, critical elasticity and critical loss analysis enhance the accuracy of merger analysis by providing a concrete basis for evaluating qualitative evidence on substitution, indicating, for example, whether a little substitution is enough to defeat a price increase. Significantly greater accuracy is achieved by 12 combining such analyses with econometric estimation of the relevant demand elasticity.
A quarter century ago, the government's expert estimated the elasticity of demand for In the 1960s, the United States Supreme Court did not share this skepticism and ruled in 15 the government's favor in many merger cases. The Supreme Court would not have had the opportunity to do so had the government not lost so frequently in district court. At that time, the Justice Department appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
While not a recent development, the use of estimated demand elasticities in market delineation has now become fairly common, in part because the development of critical elasticity analysis has provided a useful guide to their interpretation.
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Econometric evidence on demand elasticities is most needed, most helpful, and most often used with differentiated consumer products. With such products, documents and interviews tend to leave critical questions of degree unanswered. Unlike producer goods for which substitution issues are apt to turn on objective cost issues, with differentiated consumer goods, such issues inherently are matters of taste. Econometric evidence often is the most accurate, reliable, and objective basis for evaluating critical questions of degree involving consumer tastes, because they tend to be too idiosyncratic to be reckoned with sufficient accuracy without data on actual choices or survey responses.
Critical elasticity analysis greatly enhances the accuracy of econometrics-based market delineation by providing a specific value with which to compare the estimated elasticity for a candidate market. Id. at 191-92. 19 Id. at 190 n.21.
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The defendants' treated all costs associated with computer hardware and software as fixed, 21 resulting in a marginal cost that was a tiny fraction of price. This would make perfect sense if the hardware and software were long lived assets while the service was sold on a short-term basis. In this industry, however, hardware and software were replaced fairly frequently and services were sold though long-term contracts. Thus, it might have been argued that the relevant pricecost margin actually was quite low. government confronts, and the potential of calibrated economic models to solve them, are illustrated by two Department of Justice merger cases.
The merger case most recently tried by the Department concerned "disaster recovery" services for computer systems. The facts were complicated because different businesses 16 have different "recovery time objectives" and different computer facilities. The combination of a complex factual setting and the extraordinary pace of litigation made 17 it difficult for the Department to carry its burden on market delineation, and the court found the Department failed to do so. 18 The Department alleged that the relevant market was "shared hotsite services" (for certain types of computer equipment), which provide a relatively rapid recovery time, at a relatively low cost, by serving multiple clients with the same computer facilities. The central issue in the case was whether alternatives, especially internally provided hotsites, potentially providing even more rapid recovery, were in the relevant market. The court found that the government had shown that some customers would not switch away from shared hotsite services in response to a 5% price increase, but failed to show that the number of such consumers was "substantial enough that a hypothetical monopolist would find it profitable to impose such an increase in price."
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The defendants presented the court with a critical loss analysis purporting to show that the critical loss was only 5% because margins were extremely high. Because the 20 Department offered no contrary critical loss analysis, the defendants' analysis stood uncontested, and we suspect that the defendants' analysis substantially influenced the way the court viewed the substitutability evidence. That analysis indicated that very little substitution was enough to defeat a price increase, and it was impossible for the Department to show that even such little substitution would not occur. Had the court been presented with an analysis indicating that a great deal of substitution was required to prevent a price increase, the showing made by the Department might have been viewed as sufficient to establish the alleged relevant market.
Also illustrative is the 1995 challenge to the merger of leading bakers of branded white bread. Like the vast majority of government merger cases in the United States, 22 it was settled by a consent decree providing for the divestiture of assets (in this case, principally brands). Had the case gone to trial, the defendants most likely would have argued that other types of bread, perhaps all sources of carbohydrates, were in the relevant market. There is no doubt that these other products are substitutes for white bread, and the court likely would have been skeptical about a relevant market limited to white bread.
In support of its relevant market, the Department's expert calculated critical demand elasticities (for different local markets) and compared them to demand elasticities estimated from supermarket scanner data. This evidence indicated, with very high statistical confidence, that demand was less elastic than the critical value.
The 23 government's presentation surely would have been more persuasive to a skeptical judge because it used quantitative evidence in a concrete manner to shed light on the difficult questions of degree presented by market delineation.
Critical elasticity and critical loss analysis is routinely used, and it is highly influential. It has been said in litigation that "some number beats no number." The reason is that the introduction of any respectable quantitative analysis is apt to control the debate, and thereby likely win it. The use of calibrated economic models also means that expert testimony is no longer a black box to the court. Properly chosen and carefully Calibration requires that a set of prices and shares be deemed the pre-merger equilibrium.
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Prices and shares averaged over a recent period generally are used; however, the prices and shares used may never have been observed but rather are thought to be likely in the near future if the merger does not occur. While we refer to the benchmark model as "pre-merger," it is meant to reflect the world that will prevail but for the merger. Failing to calibrate in this manner is a common error that renders meaningless the comparison between the predicted prices post merger and the actual prices pre merger. Oligopoly models are "equilibrium" models, i.e, they determine a set of competitive strategies (usually prices or quantities) at which no competitor has an incentive to change its strategy, given the strategies of rivals. Calibrating such a model involves setting its 26 parameters so that it exactly predicts the pre-merger equilibrium. For example, plugging the pre-merger prices into the model must yield the pre-merger shares.
The simplest oligopoly model for predicting the competitive effects of mergers probably is the "dominant firm model." It posits that all firms but one in an industry act 28 as a "competitive fringe," producing up to the point at which their marginal costs of production equal the market price, as all firms do in a competitive industry. The remaining firm is the dominant firm, and it acts as a monopolist with respect its "residual demand curve," i.e., the portion of total industry demand that the competitive fringe does not supply. This model may be appropriate in an industry with a homogeneous product if the merged firm would be substantially larger than its rivals. The model can be calibrated from information on the elasticity of market demand and the pre-merger margins and productive capacities of the relevant competitors. To predict the competitive effects of mergers, it is necessary to "recover" the marginal 33 costs for each product in the model. This normally is not done by directly measuring costs. Rather, the equilibrium conditions of the model are solved for the marginal costs implied by the observed prices and shares. The implied marginal costs then can be compared with cost information that may be available. We generally have found that the implied marginal costs correspond closely to what is known about actual marginal costs, at least for major products.
What that means is that the markup of price over cost in the model, and hence the intensity of competition, is at least roughly the same as the intensity of actual competition. , 1996) .
that the intensity of competition in the Bertrand model matches well with that observed pre merger.
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A differentiated products merger simulation is calibrated with readily observable information on the prices and "shares" of brands in the simulation, and with potentially observable information on the elasticities of demand (own and cross) of those brands.
34
A simulation may be more or less inclusive than the relevant market, and these "shares"
are merely the relative quantities for the included brands.
The prices of brands included in a simulation are determined by the competition among them and their prices may change as the merger alters competition. The prices of brands excluded from a simulation are assumed to be unaffected by the merger.
Narrowing the list of included brands merely narrows the list of brands for which prices may increase, and because the prices of excluded products generally would be affected very little by a merger, excluding them just imparts a very slight downward bias to the price increase predictions. The critical implication of the foregoing is that market
In the United States, case law precedent mandates market delineation, but we believe it 35 is only a matter of time before courts embrace direct methods for predicting the competitive effects of mergers, since they already embrace direct evidence of market power. We also believe that delineating a relevant market actually may undermine a challenge to a merger. With highly differentiated consumer products, the relevant market delineated by the hypothetical monopolist paradigm may be as narrow as the two merging brands (if they are next-best substitutes and the merger would increase their prices at least 5%), yet such narrow markets are not alleged in merger complaints because of a well-founded belief that judges would reject them out of hand. And when a broad relevant market is alleged, some judges take this to be a concession that all products in the market are very close substitutes for each other.
Estimating demand elasticities with real-world data presents a host of complex issues 36 beyond the scope of this paper.
A common symptom of high variance is negative estimated cross elasticities, indicating 37 brands are complements, even though they are known to be substitutes.
We refer mainly to the Antitrust Logit Model (ALM), a reformulation of the conventional 38 logit model designed to make it more user friendly to practitioners of merger analysis. For details delineation is irrelevant to merger analysis based on merger simulation.
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Ideally, the demand elasticities used to calibrate the model would be estimated from a rich data source that makes it possible to reliably measure all of the relevant own and cross elasticities of demand. Precisely estimated demand elasticities significantly enhance the fit between the model and the facts of the case and hence significantly increase the accuracy of the predictions as well as the persuasiveness of the analysis in court. The data available in the real word, however, are never ideal and generally present a trade-off between variance and bias.
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The number of elasticities that must be estimated increases with the square of the number of brands included in a simulation. Unless some structure is imposed on substitution patterns, their number easily may be so large that the data are inadequate to the task. Econometricians then say that the estimator has a high "variance." Variance 37 can be reduced by asking less of the data, which is done by imposing structure on substitution patterns, but that may mean imposing unrealistic substitution patterns.
Econometricians then say that the estimator is "biased."
At one extreme in the variance-bias trade-off is the logit model, in which just two parameters determine all of the own and cross elasticities of demand for the included brands. One of these parameters is the aggregate elasticity of demand for all brands in shares of 60%, 30%, and 10%, and the price of brand C is increased, the IIA property says that the substitution from brand C to brand A must be twice that from C to B, because the share of A is twice that of B.
Absent contrary evidence, substitution in proportion is often viewed as the most natural default assumption. We share that view because we think the IIA property most 40 reflective of not only its relative appeal as a first choice to consumers of the merging firms products but also its relative appeal as a second choice, and hence as a competitive constraint to the first choice. Where this circumstance holds, market concentration data fall outside the safeharbor regions of Section 1.5, and the merging firms have a combined market share of at least thirty-five percent, the Agency will presume that a significant share of sales in the market are accounted for by consumers who regard the products of the merging firms as their first and second choices.
The logit model restricts substitution patterns only for the brands included in a simulation.
41
Thus, the narrower the range of included brands, the less restrictive the logit model is. And since excluding brands typically is of little consequence to the price-increase predictions, the range of included brands may be quite narrow.
Our discussion is based on information contained in the Authority' As is typical with differentiated consumer products, the readily available price and share 43 data are those for the retail level. To simulate competition among brewers, therefore, requires a model relating the retail and wholesale levels. The need for that model is acute in this case because of the differential tax treatment of 2.8% and 3.5% beer. We assume the simplest model: Let w be the wholesale price of brand i in SEK/liter and r its retail price. Assume retailers set i i prices by marking up the wholesale price by a fixed proportion s, then add any alcohol taxes. With a VAT of 12%, r = (.12 + s)w for 2.8% beer, and for 3.5% beer, which has an added We aggregate all brands with the same brewer and alcohol content. Hence, the Pripps 44 2.8% demand elasticity is that for an aggregate of all Pripps 2.8% brands.
average retail prices and shares for Class II beer.
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The logit model has two demand parameters, and with knowledge of neither, we consider a range of values. If Class II beer is a relevant market, the aggregate elasticity of demand for it must be less than the critical elasticity of demand, and for price-cost margins typical of U.S. manufacturing, the critical elasticity would be roughly 1.5. Thus,
we consider values of 0.5 to 1.5. Given prices, shares, and an aggregate elasticity, completing the model requires selecting a value for the one remaining demand parameter, and that may be done by fixing the value for any of the brand-level elasticities of demand.
We fix the elasticity of demand for Pripps 2.8% alcohol beer, and consider elasticity As the investigation proceeded, it may also have been possible to estimate the relevant demand elasticities. If so, the simulation analysis could have been refined significantly, and a model of demand other than simple logit might have been used.
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Mergers, 7 INT'L J. ECON. BUS. 179 (2000) . It is also possible to incorporate any effects of remedies on costs. For example, it is possible to model royalty payments from one competitor to another that could result from a licensing arrangement. While probably never an appropriate remedy, it is easy to incorporate pricing limitations in a simulation.
Most conspicuously, with constant elasticity demand, all own and cross elasticities are Merger simulation also increases the focus and accuracy of the analysis of differentiated products merger is other ways. It provides a mechanism for explicitly trading off a reduction in competition against cost reductions from merger synergies.
And it provides a mechanism for evaluating possible remedies, most notably the divestiture of particular brands. If brands are not all equally good substitutes for each other, or if there are synergies from the combination of just some of the merging firms' brands, simulation can enhance the accuracy of merger analysis by indicating the best remedy.
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An important limitation of merger simulation with differentiated products is that price-increase predictions are sensitive to the functional form for demand. Conventional functional forms all impose both particular rates at which each product's demand becomes more elastic as its price is increased, and idiosyncratic responses of cross elasticities to price changes. A direct consequence is that the functional form of demand 48 substantially determines the magnitude of price increases from a merger. Of the demand forms in common use, linear and logit demand yield the smallest price increases. Two other commonly used functional forms, constant elasticity and AIDS demand, typically 49 yield price increases that are at least several times those with linear or logit demand. 50 The same properties that cause different demand forms to yield very different price increase also cause them to yield very different pass-through rates for marginal-cost reductions.
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The dependence of merger simulation on the functional form of demand suggests the desirability of using calibrated economic models in a manner that makes them insensitive to the functional form of demand. This is done by computing the compensating marginal cost reductions (CMCRs), i.e., those that exactly offset the price-increasing effects of a merger. CMCRs do not depend on the functional form of demand for the simple reason that the equilibrium prices and quantities post merger are precisely the same as those pre merger. Using the same inputs as merger simulation-prices, shares, and demand elasticities-it is relatively simple to compute the CMCRs for a differentiated products merger. If merger synergies appear likely to reduce the merging firms cost as much as 52 the CMCRs, it follows that the merger is unlikely to harm consumers. And if merger synergies clearly fall well short of those necessary to prevent price increase, it follows that significant price increase are likely.
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Conclusions
Calibrated economic models provide concrete, quantitative analyses of market delineation and the competitive effects of mergers. These analyses are firmly grounded in the facts of the case and based on well-accepted models of monopoly and oligopoly.
Their use significantly enhances the focus, accuracy, and persuasiveness of merger analysis in many ways.
Nevertheless, some lawyers are reluctant to rely on calibrated economic models, especially in court. The main reason appears to be a belief that such analyses cannot be adequately understood by judges and thus appear as a black box. Our view is almost precisely the opposite. Expert analysis based on calibrated economic models is a black box only if presented in a highly summary, and clearly inappropriate, fashion. When calibrated economic models are properly used and presented, they make clear how an expert's conclusions follow from the facts of the case. Economic models are built on assumptions, which should be stated explicitly. Once explicitly stated, assumptions can be attacked and defended largely on the basis of the factual record in the case. The use of calibrated economic models therefore makes the battle of the experts into what it should be-a debate over links in a chain of economic logic connecting established facts to ultimate conclusions. Useful economic analysis identifies the links that really matter and explains them in terms judges can comprehend.
